Yi Xianrong: China'S Policy Of Volume And Width Starts All Over.

Since the beginning of 7-8, with the drop in domestic real estate market prices and the rapid decrease in sales, not only has the pressure on domestic economic growth been increased, but also the real estate crisis in many places and the risk of regional financial bubbles in some areas are exposed.

Therefore, by the end of September, faced with the possibility of domestic regional and systemic risks, the government's macroeconomic regulation and control policy began to turn a major turn.

The most important sign of the major turn of this macro-control policy is that the central bank and the Banking Regulatory Commission issued the notice on further housing finance services in September 30th.

The issuance of the notice not only interrupted the cyclical adjustment of the real estate market and the expected market turn, but also meant the end of the new government's economic policy in the past two years.

Because the essence of the notice is not only a change in real estate policy, that is, through the excessive credit preferential policy to save the market where housing prices are falling slightly, but also to take the real estate industry as a tool for macroeconomic regulation and control, and also to make China's economic growth return to the "real estate" economy.

Because, according to the contents of the notice, it seems to be through the excessive preferential policies of the banks to improve the housing welfare level of the residents, and to release the housing demand of the residents. But in fact, this kind of housing demand is not the consumption demand of the residents, but mainly the speculative investment housing demand of the residents.

However, the excessive investment of bank credit is the key to the prosperity of the real estate market in the past few years. It is also the source of domestic economic, political and social problems in the past few years.

Because, under the current level of housing prices, no matter what credit preferential policies are introduced, it is impossible for the housing consumers to enter the market.

Even if a small number of housing consumers have the ability to enter the market, they can only take up the high priced housing and increase their burden.

Therefore, when housing prices are at a high level, the introduction of credit preferential policies is not conducive to the real housing market consumers, but to the housing speculators.

In particular, the most important thing in the notice is to encourage people to hold or hold more housing. Residents who have paid off bank loans may enter the housing market through excessive preferential credit policies.

Just imagine that in the absence of strict housing tax policies and hindrant restrictions, the purchase of a housing can be used for speculative investment. How can a resident holding more than two sets of housing do not buy housing as a speculative investment or a means of making money, but only a so-called "improved housing"? That is to say, the new housing policy fully encourages speculative investment in residential housing, and the overall easing of its real estate policy can be as good as that of the 131 document in 2008.

Moreover, from the contents of the monetary policy report released in the third quarter of 2014, the Central Bank of China began to adjust the direction of monetary policy from September. Under the principle of "directional easing", the central bank has injected a lot of liquidity into the banking system. Moreover, the liquidity injection into the market is quite different from the traditional easing policy of the central bank. That is, instead of using the traditional monetary policy tools, the central bank takes the experience of the major monetary banks in the US, Japan and Europe to apply the new monetary policy tools, and recombines loans, rediscount, short-term liquidity adjustment, mortgage supplementary loans, and SLF.

The monetary policy report pointed out that in September and October, the people's Bank of China passed the interim period.

Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF) provides basic currency 500 billion yuan and 269 billion 800 million yuan respectively to state-owned commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks, large scale city commercial banks and rural commercial banks, with a term of 3 months, with an interest rate of 3.5%. In providing liquidity and giving play to the medium-term policy interest rate, it guides commercial banks to lower the interest rate of loans and social financing costs, and support real economic growth.

That is to say, the 9-10 central banks have been carrying out directional easing through MLF instead of StandingLending Facility (SLF).

Moreover, the overall easing of the central bank's monetary policy is also reflected in encouraging the banking industry to issue American style MBS when launching the new housing loan policy, hoping to inject more liquidity into the banking system through this way.

Some analysts pointed out that in 2014, the overall easing policy of the Central Bank of China, and its related measures, even more than the second half of 2008, the financial crisis of the government to recruit more liquidity, the policy is more frequent.

However, the tools used are different.

Therefore, the central bank's overall loose monetary policy market concern is not so high.

Under such circumstances, the scale of financing this year, whether it is the credit growth of the banking system or the growth of the total amount of social financing, will probably reach the highest level in history.

For example, in the first 9 months of this year, the balance of loans issued by banks increased by RMB 7 trillion and 700 billion.

At this rate, domestic bank credit growth is expected to reach more than 10 trillion yuan, possibly a record high.

Such a credit growth is far greater than the quantitative easing scale of the three major central banks in Europe and the United States and Japan.

And in the central bank.

The national development and Reform Commission has also accelerated the examination and approval of major projects when the overall volume is shifting.

The NDRC recently announced that the investment in major water conservancy projects under construction has reached 600 billion yuan.

Since October, six railways and five airport infrastructure projects have been approved, with RMB investment amounting to 2500 yuan.

That is, the current market is the Marshall plan advocated.

It can be said that whether it is from the experience of the second half of 2008 or from the experience of the United States and Japan in terms of the breadth and breadth policy, the Chinese style is also true.

Although excessive credit expansion can ease the downward pressure on the economy in the short term and even create short-term economic prosperity, it is uncertain whether it can bring the national economy to sustained growth and prosperity.

The government must weigh it carefully.